15 years of

Indonesia’s National Community-Driven Development Programs
The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP)
The National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM)
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For more than fifteen years, Indonesia has been pioneering and implementing various community-driven development (CDD) projects and programs. Beginning in 1997, when the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) was piloted in 25 villages, Indonesia has pioneered the design, management, and expansion of projects that give communities more control over the plans and resources that shape their towns and villages. In 2007, the Government decided to scale up the KDP nationwide and renamed it the National Program for Community Empowerment (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri or PNPM Mandiri), ultimately reaching more than 70,000 villages and urban wards across the archipelago.

With the passage of the Law No. 6 of 2014 on Village (Village Law), Indonesia’s CDD efforts are set to move into a new phase, and it seems an appropriate time to take stock of the lessons drawn from the experience of starting the Indonesian CDD program and taking it to national scale.

This annotated bibliography draws together articles, evaluations, studies, and other materials that reflect the lessons learned from fifteen years of research, covering a broad array of topics connected to KDP and PNPM Mandiri, including program design and management, participation and empowerment, transparency and accountability, microcredit, relations with government and civil society organizations, and the effectiveness of CDD approaches in urban areas and post-conflict situations. Most of the materials included here were published by the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), a multi-donor trust fund facility managed by the World Bank on behalf of the Government of Indonesia. All materials included are freely available to the public.

Because the emphasis is on lessons learned, certain kinds of publications, such as baseline studies and strategy papers, have been left out. Anyone interested in going beyond the scope of this bibliography can find more information at http://www.pnpm-support.org, http://www.psflibrary.org, or the World Bank’s Open Knowledge Repository at http://openknowledge.worldbank.org.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Government of Aceh implemented its own version of PNPM, called Bantuan Keuangan Peumakmu Gampong, or BKPG, in 2009. By 2012, BKPG had disbursed over IDR 1.5 trillion (around USD120 million) to support investments in village infrastructure, savings and loan groups for women, education, health, and village governance, among other activities. Unlike the national PNPM, BKPG provided an equal amount of block grants to all villages in Aceh. This evaluation examines the overall performance of BKPG, general public awareness of the program, and public perceptions about its effectiveness. Key findings include:

- 63 percent of survey respondents had heard of BKPG, results in line with findings on awareness of PNPM outside Aceh. Almost half of these (49 percent) reported hearing about the program through more than one source, and 25 percent through three or more sources. The commonest way that respondents heard about the program was through social networks, including friends, family and neighbors (68 percent of respondents).
- There were significant gender differences in awareness of the program: 51 percent of female respondents had heard of BKPG, versus 76 percent of male respondents.
- Among those who reported having attended BKPG meetings, a large majority (71 percent) attended only one or two meetings.
- 45 percent of male respondents had attended at least one meeting of BKPG, versus only 18 percent of female respondents.
- 65 percent of women who attended BKPG meetings reported “only listening” compared with 47 percent of men.

These findings suggest that that many villagers face opportunity costs, societal norms, or other factors that limit their engagement with participatory projects. The report’s authors suggest that the plebiscite model of project selection proposed by Olken (2010) may be an appropriate way to increase broad-based participation. Community leaders, shown here to be a key source of information about community programs, should be targeted for training in budgeting and responsive governance. Further research may be needed to illuminate the ways community leaders decide how to allocate funding and respond to village needs. Similar to PNPM in other contexts, BKPG is perceived as serving general needs, and not the needs of poor or marginalized groups. Implementation of the new village law (Law No. 6/2014 on Villages) may benefit from programs (similar to PEKKA, an empowerment program
for female-headed households) that specifically target those communities, while being sensitive to the social dynamics and opportunity costs that prevent poor and female-headed households from participating in community programs.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Evaluasi Program Bantuan Keuangan Desa (Bantuan Keuangan Peumakmu Gampong, BKPG) di Provinsi Aceh

INTEGRATING COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES INTO POLICY:
FROM PNPM MANDIRI TO THE VILLAGE LAW

Edited by Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K)
Published by: Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K), Jakarta

With the Village Law (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Desa, or UU Desa) signed in early 2014, Indonesia has taken the CDD principles of PNPM Mandiri from programs into policy. This report reviews the strengths and limitations of PNPM, and offers an outline of how to support, and limit the risks to, the process of building the real frameworks of the Village Law.

While the Village Law is aligned with CDD principles generally and PNPM processes specifically, the details of its implementation are laid out in government regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah, or PP), some of which move in opposing directions.

- The Village Law clearly intends for the participatory development of both annual and medium-term village plans. But the PP Desa emphasizes the village head’s leadership.
- Poor households are not specifically mentioned in the implementation guidelines.
- The village government has discretion to define “legitimate” organizations to partner with, a power that could undermine village organizations that do not have explicit state sanction.
- The Village Law stipulates that the community can obtain information from village governments on a wide range of activities. The PP Desa points only to the village head’s responsibility to inform villagers about governance implementation in writing and through easily accessible media. There is no overall requirement for a report to villagers from the village government regarding implementation of the Rencana Kerja Pemerintah (RKP) and the budget.
- The Village Law specifies that Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (BPD) members should be representatives of village residents based on territorial representation, chosen democratically. Meanwhile, the PP Desa states that the specific mechanisms for choosing BPD members are left up to districts, and makes no mention of territorial representation.
- The PP Desa provides weaker accountability than PNPM did for funds transfers, allowing funds to flow with signatures from only the village head and treasurer.

The report recommends a focus on the poverty impact of improved governance. Additional resources should be dedicated to ensuring that governance mechanisms work well in the poorest villages and regions. Understanding and adjusting to variations in the implementation of the Village Law in different political, economic, and social contexts will be instrumental to achieving its objectives, and its implementation should include multiple processes for continuous learning and adjustment. There should be a central unit at the national level to lead and coordinate the management of the transition and implementation of the new Village Law.
http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7093


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Mengintegrasikan Prinsip Pembangunan Berbasis Masyarakat ke Dalam Kebijakan: Dari PNPM Mandiri menjadi UU Desa


EXPANDING AND DIVERSIFYING INDONESIA’S PROGRAM FOR COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT, 2007-2012

Jonathan Friedman
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This case study charts the expansion of Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) into the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM). The case offers some key lessons on scaling up community-driven development (CDD) programs.

• Built-in learning was a key component of PNPM’s success: rigorous baseline studies and impact evaluations to determine the effectiveness of the program, conducted by the PNPM Support Facility (PSF).
• When these studies revealed shortcomings in PNPM, PSF had the freedom and funding to design and implement innovative pilot programs to address such gaps.
• Studies created opportunities for government agencies, development partners, universities, and civil society organizations (CSOs) to discuss broader policy issues. In this way, PSF served as a platform for government and non-government actors to share ideas.
• Major obstacles to the scaling-up of PNPM included regional variation, especially in Papua, and management issues at the national level, where PNPM was handled by a very small number of civil servants.
• PNPM was expected to spur communities to demand improved transparency and service delivery from their local governments, but this “spillover” failed to occur.

The paper concludes with a discussion of the integration of PNPM values into new legislation, especially the 2014 Village Law.

GENDER INCLUSION STRATEGIES IN PNPM

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

As a nationwide program, PNPM has enormous potential to address barriers to gender equality; but its size also prevents PNPM from engaging with the nuances of the differences within communities, or tending to the needs of particular groups. This report explores a tactical approach to bringing gender awareness into the mainstream, so that PNPM can serve women better.

The areas in need of urgent attention are:

- Gender dynamics in the decision-making process. Gender awareness among the staff is low, with less than one quarter receiving gender-awareness training, which is not part of the national-level training. PNPM’s affirmative action policies are being followed, but mechanistically. As yet, PNPM has not had a strong affect on gender issues, or built solidarity among women.
- The gendered division of labor, where women’s labor is invisible. Women often provided snack and food during program’s meetings and infrastructure building and did other menial jobs. However, these often went un-noticed and were not formerly acknowledged as providing labors. Women are invited to PNPM meetings not to participate in planning but to receive orders, especially to undertake work that men find demeaning or tedious. Women are often expected to give their labor for free.
- Improving possibilities for women to build, control and own assets (even if the beginnings are modest).

The report recommends that PNPM put together a national gender strategy, train facilitators in gender issues, and include gender indicators in the national management information system (MIS). These indicators should include impacts, as well as process—not just a headcount of women who attend PNPM meetings, but whether participation in PNPM leads to any benefits for these women. A PNPM child care program would allow women to significantly improve their productivity and participation. The report also recommends that staff engage more actively with local social conditions, including customary law (adat).

INFRASTRUCTURE CENSUS: REPORT ON INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPLY READINESS IN INDONESIA – ACHIEVEMENTS AND REMAINING GAPS

PNPM Support Facility
Published by: PNPM Support Facility in cooperation with Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K), Jakarta

A census of basic village infrastructure, including health and education, conducted using the 2011 round of the national village census, known as *Potensi Desa* or PODES. The census provides detailed information on 166,506 health facilities and 164,561 schools all across the country, using seven indicators along three dimensions: (i) availability and accessibility; (ii) presence and qualification of personnel; and (iii) the physical characteristics of the facilities. The data go deeper than the provincial level, allowing analysis of districts and sub-districts.

- The largest gaps in availability were in Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, and remote parts of Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
- There are large variations within provinces. The urban-rural divide is substantial; cities have both more infrastructure and better services than rural areas.
- More than 6 million Indonesians have no or poor access to primary health care, and 36 million lack access to inpatient hospital care.
- More than 9 million have no access to a junior secondary school (SMP), and 16.6 million lack early childhood education facilities (PAUD or TK).

The study recommends sharing this information as widely as possible, so that local governments and line ministries can plan against it, development planners can improve their targeting, and communities can better hold their leaders accountable. Future infrastructure censuses should also include private schools and clinics.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

*Sensus Infrastruktur: Laporan tentang Kesiapan Suplai Infrastruktur di Indonesia – Capaian dan Kesenjangan yang Masih Terjadi*

THE LOCAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS STUDY 3: OVERVIEW REPORT

Anna Wetterberg, Jon R. Jellema, Leni Dharmawan
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

The first Local Level Institutions (LLI) study, carried out in 1996, provided key evidence and inspiration for KDP. Follow-ups in 2000/2001 (LLI2) and 2012 (LLI3) returned to the same study areas in Jambi, Central Java, and East Nusa Tenggara, seeking to track changes in local capacity (defined as the ability to solve common problems collectively), identify the conditions that contribute to rises or declines in capacity, and trace the effects of decentralization, democratization, and the expansion of participatory programs since 2001. The new study combines updated versions of the qualitative and quantitative research instruments used in LLI2.

Some key findings include:
- About half of the studied villages held the same capacity; about one third declined, and about one quarter improved.
- The decline was linked to a loss of environmental resources, reduced reciprocity, and unresponsive leadership.
- Strong capacity was self-reinforcing, and weak capacity could (but did not always) lead into a downward spiral.
- Reformist officials and external forces such as NGOs were often important to improving capacity, but just boosting the powers of “good” village heads was not enough.

The report suggests that policymakers should create new mechanisms to make government more responsive to citizens through improved information flows and greater accountability, including monitoring both from below and above. Simply increasing funding could exacerbate conflict in low-capacity villages, and any additional funds must be carefully monitored. Development programs should encourage the empowerment of a diverse group of leaders at the community level, ensuring that a variety of voices are heard, and power does not concentrate in the hands of an elite.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Studi Kelembagaan Tingkat Lokal Ke-3: Laporan Akhir

QUALITATIVE STUDY OF THE PROLIFERATION AND INTEGRATION OF COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMS

Muhammad Syukri, Hastuti, Akhmad, Kartawijaya, Asep Kurniawan
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

In 2010, the then president ordered all community-driven development programs to be folded into PNPM, the National Community Empowerment Program, and instructed PNPM to integrate with an existing mechanism for medium- to long-term planning, the village development planning meeting (musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan desa, or Musrenbangdes). This study asks how well these projects and procedures are integrating. The findings suggest:

- Smooth integration relies on support at all levels: from dedicated village heads, CSOs, and community leaders at the grassroots level, to local and national governments. Where there is proper support, projects and programs can be integrated more or less easily, but that support is largely lacking in practice.
- Weak information flows between villages and government make government-run frontline services very difficult to integrate into village planning.
- Integration alone is not making PNPM or the Musrenbangdes more inclusive. Full inclusion still depends on the efforts of facilitators, NGOs, and community leaders.

The study recommends explicitly tying all development programs to the Musrenbangdes, creating a single system for budgeting, reporting, and accountability that spans all projects, and using CSOs to ensure that local governments design their work plans in response to community needs.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6994

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Studi Kualitatif Proliferasi dan Integrasi Program Pemberdayaan Masyarakat

This study looks at how village-level health actors and institutions interact (or fail to do so) with community members and with the various levels of government, and considers how much power they command and how much trust they enjoy. It also examines the approaches to improving citizen engagement taken by the Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS) and the Australian-Indonesian Partnership on Maternal and Neo-natal Health (AIPMNH). Finally, it discusses the use of data. The findings include:

- The health sector appears reluctant to value the opinion of anyone without a health background, and does not fully explore obstacles to access such as poor transportation, information, and communications, and significant up-front costs.
- Health information is managed in a bureaucratic way. If a district nutritionist post is empty, for example, no one else at that level feels empowered or required to provide nutrition information.
- The midwife is the critical first point for villagers to engage with the health system. Traditional midwives are most women’s primary source of health information—both right and wrong—and in many places there are no other health facilities to go to.
- The current policy of excluding traditional midwives from the health system precludes engaging with them constructively, and erodes village-level support networks without providing an alternative.
- In every village visited, the village health post (Posyandu) and its cadres were women’s main point of contact with the formal health system.
- Linkages between community health centers (Puskesmas), midwives, and Posyandu workers are often weak, and linkages with “non-health” actors are virtually non-existent.
- Nearly every health program collects its own data, out of a distrust of other sources.
- Sanctions for poor results may push some individuals to falsify data.

The study recommends engaging with traditional midwives and healers, offering them training and support, and listening to them instead of excluding them from the health system. Links should be strengthened between actors at the village level—midwives, Posyandu, Puskesmas, and village government—and village heads should be trained and encouraged to engage with health issues. NGO advocacy should be explored further. Several problematic policy areas should be discussed: punitive approaches to service delivery; the real costs of a facilities-based approach; and emergency services, among others. PNPM Generasi’s position with the health department should be improved, perhaps by hiring a specialist ‘health facilitator’ to liaise between them and help PNPM Generasi use data for advocacy on health issues. PNPM Generasi could also be coordinated through the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) instead of the community empowerment division, putting it in a stronger cross-sectoral position.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7045
This study examines the community institutions set up by PNPM: the Inter-village Cooperation Boards (Badan Kerjasama Antar Desa, or BKAD), Financial Management Unit (Unit Pengelolaan Keuangan, or UPK), the UPK Monitoring Body (Badan Pengawas-Unit Pengelolaan Keuangan, or BP-UPK), and the Project Management Team (Tim Pengelolaan Kegiatan, or TKP) in PNPM Rural, and Community Self-Help Groups (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat, or BKM, and Lembaga Keswadayaan Masyarakat, or LKM) in PNPM Urban. The study asks what these institutions do, what their legal status is, and what kinds of support they require to function. The study also looks for instances where the PNPM principles of transparency, accountability, and participation have expanded beyond the borders of the program and into other villages processes, including village government.

- The community PNPM experience, positive as it has been, has not inspired people to demand more from government.
- The PNPM process has been dominated in some places by the kepala desa and village elites, without interference from the institutions set up to prevent this from happening, such as the Village Consultative Body (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, or BPD).
- This weakness is due in part to the overwhelming amounts of administrative work and reporting that facilitators are required to do.

The report recommends using binding regulations to extend PNPM’s principles of transparency to the management of village budgets. The implementation of these principles should be measured against a few key indicators, with sanctions for violators and incentives for high performers. Village-level checks and balances should be put in place; these mechanisms should be permanent, not project-based. Social facilitation will be needed to ensure that village budgets are not captured by elites.


http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/download/studi-kelompok-masyarakat-pnpm/
INDONESIA: EVALUATION OF THE URBAN COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

PNPM Support Facility
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank in cooperation with Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare and Ministry of Public Works, Jakarta

PNPM Urban, a CDD program that delivers block grants to the urban poor for small-scale infrastructure, and social and economic development, currently serves all urban areas in Indonesia. The program aims to foster community participation, improve local governance, and deliver basic needs at the community level. This policy note draws on two qualitative field studies assessing how specific aspects of the program are working, particularly for the infrastructure component, and documenting good practices and lessons learned.

- PNPM Urban projects are viewed as well-chosen and targeted, and independent assessments show that the infrastructure built through the program is of high quality.
- Community organizations are perceived to be working relatively well, independent of government programs and structures.
- The most frequently cited barrier for participation was the time-cost of the process, which can be substantial.
- Community members and key informants name social and economic services as their first priorities, not infrastructure.
- Larger, more complex projects require strong financial management and skilled labor, making it more difficult to involve (untrained) community members in implementation.

The report recommends increasing funding for social and economic activities, in part as a way to increase the participation of women. Facilitators should be given better training and a lighter administrative burden, so they can focus on empowerment, inclusion, and better data collection. PNPM Urban should also develop manuals, with instructions on planning for maintenance, coordinating with local governments, and improving communication between PNPM groups in neighboring areas.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6527
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17870

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Indonesia: Evaluasi Program Pembangunan Berbasis Masyarakat Perkotaan

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6528
INDONESIA: URBAN POVERTY AND PROGRAM REVIEW

PNPM Support Facility - World Bank
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank in cooperation with Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare and Ministry of Public Works, Jakarta

This study combines information from the National Socio-economic Survey (Susenas) 2002-10 and the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) with qualitative studies of the urban poor in 16 locations, building a holistic picture of urban poverty with a focus on participation in social assistance programs and the accessibility and use of basic services. Key findings include:

- Key challenges named by poor urban communities: low incomes, scarce jobs, and high school expenses. Poor infrastructure and lack of capital were also mentioned, but at a lower level of priority.
- Social protection programs such as Rice for the Poor (Beras Miskin, or Raskin), community health insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, or Jamkesmas), and unconditional cash transfers (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or BLT) do reach many of the urban poor and near-poor. Leakages in these programs are significant, but the rate of leakage in urban areas is well below the rate in rural areas.

The study recommends a focus on two main policy areas:
- Economic policies that improve economic returns from urbanization, including investments in infrastructure, ensuring that infrastructure development is inclusive of the poor and anticipates the needs of poor communities, and expanding access to credit.
- Social policies that extend access to education and health for the urban poor, insure households against a sudden loss of income, and improve the design and targeting of existing programs.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6529
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16301

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Indonesia: Kemiskinan Perkotaan dan Ulasan Program

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6530
OPPORTUNITIES AND APPROACHES FOR BETTER NUTRITION OUTCOMES THROUGH PNPM GENERASI

Jesse Hession Grayman, Nelti Anggraini, Siti Ruhanawati
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

PNPM Healthy and Smart Generation (Generasi sehat dan cerdas, known as Generasi) uses incentivized block grants to help communities improve maternal and child health, ensure universal access to primary education, and reduce poverty. An impact evaluation showed that PNPM Generasi effectively reduced malnutrition, but could not explain the mechanisms behind this success. This report asks how chronic malnutrition indicators rise and fall, how much PNPM Generasi affects that process, and to what extent PNPM Generasi has changed the behavior of health service users and providers. The main findings include:

• PNPM Generasi reaches remote areas by leveraging existing village health posts (Posyandu) in new ways. Midwives, through Posyandu, help connect communities with government health services.
• Providers reach out to people they believe are “deserving” of health service, and not to those they feel are “undeserving.”
• Most PNPM Generasi funding is spent on supplementary feeding, which draws parents and children to their local Posyandu. But this feeding does not actually impact chronic malnutrition.
• Neither providers nor users of health services fully understand the way incentivized grants work.
• In PNPM Generasi, both knowledge and resources are vulnerable to capture and rent-seeking.

The report suggests placing limits on the amount that can be spent on supplementary food, while improving the quality of the food that is bought through the program. PNPM Generasi should do more to build the skills of Posyandu volunteers, and offer higher incentives to more skilled workers. PNPM Generasi should also extend training opportunities to traditional birthing assistants, and welcome them into the official health system instead of pushing them away.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6922
RESULTS EVALUATION: SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THROUGH PNPM GREEN INVESTMENTS – A RURAL LIVELIHOOD ANALYSIS

Vivianti Rambe, Steffen Johnsen
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

PNPM Green was designed to improve the ability of poor communities to manage their environments and benefit from their natural resources. PNPM Green worked in eight provinces, supporting only four kinds of project: natural resource management, income generating activities, renewable energy, and capacity building, all of which should contribute to positive environmental impacts. PNPM Green funded extra facilitators to mainstream the concept of sustainability.

This report evaluates the economic, social, and environmental benefits of PNPM Green, drawing on three separate studies: the Economic and Livelihood Study (by LPM Equator), Micro-Hydropower – Return on Investment (MHP – ROI) Study (by Castlerock), and the Spillover Effects Study (by CARDS-IPB). Some key findings from the evaluation include:

- PNPM Green should help preserve or improve natural assets, but those benefits will only merge fully in the long term, for example, as mangrove forests mature.
- Micro-hydro projects are not viable in generating economic returns, but have considerable social benefits.
- PNPM Green livelihoods projects often succeeded in creating viable, sustainable income-generating or cost-saving activities.

Participation in PNPM Green is likely to rise if the project: (a) follows the participants' livelihood priorities; (b) provides immediate benefits; (c) directly increases household incomes; (d) is supported by local values, local regulations, or local knowledge; and (e) is co-facilitated by community leaders and local government officials.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21128

Bahasa Indonesian version:

Evaluasi Hasil: Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam yang Berkelanjutan melalui Investasi PNPM-LMP

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6816
SHOULD AID REWARD PERFORMANCE?: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN INDONESIA (NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 17892)

Benjamin A. Olken, Junko Onishi, Susan Wong
Published by: National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge

This paper asks whether the performance incentives in PNPM Generasi actually improved performance on a raft of health and education measures. In a randomized controlled trial, 3,000 villages receiving block grants for maternal and child health and education were divided into three groups: a group with incentives, a group without incentives, and a pure control group. Surveys were conducted at baseline, and then 18 and 30 months after the program started. With over 1.8 million target beneficiaries, this was one of the largest randomized social experiments ever conducted. Findings included:

• PNPM Generasi, with or without incentives, had a statistically significant positive impact on 12 health and education indicators, such as regular weight checks for children, pre- and postnatal care, and school participation rates.
• Villages with incentives reached their health goals faster. The boost was especially pronounced in underdeveloped villages.
• After 30 months the differences between the incentivized and non-incentivized areas were no longer statistically significant. This is not because the incentivized groups stopped performing, but because the non-incentivized groups caught up.
• Other than the decline in malnutrition at 18 months, ultimate health outcomes were no better with incentives.
• Incentives had no special impact on education.

The paper suggests two ways the incentives may have worked:

• Incentives led to an increase in the supply of midwives, the major providers of the preventative care services (e.g., prenatal care, regular weight checks for children). But incentives did not lead to a greater number of teachers. One possible explanation is that midwives are paid on a fee-for-service basis, whereas teachers are not.
• Incentives may have led to a more efficient use of funds. Areas with incentives shifted funds towards health costs and away from education supplies; yet there was no drop in the number of households that received education supplies, and students were actually more likely to receive scholarships.

This reallocation of budgets was very important, suggesting that incentives may work better when put in place at a level of government high enough to have some budget flexibility.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7063
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17892
This report aimed to assess the financial performance of Revolving Loan Funds (RLF) attached to PNPM Rural and PNPM Urban, and the capacity of local financial units (UPK) to run them. It asks whether UPK can continue to operate without government assistance, and what would have to change for UPK to become sustainable.

- Only 28 percent of rural RLFSs and 9 percent of urban RLFSs are sustainable.
- Most loans are in the USD 100-150 range.
- RLFSs have reached substantial numbers of customers, with about 1.6 million borrowers in the four provinces surveyed.
- RLFSs in rural areas serve more customers than urban ones, probably because there are more alternative providers of credit in urban areas.
- The most important problem facing RLFSs is that in most locations both the borrowers and the community leaders on financial review committees are under the impression that the RLF supplies grants, not loans.
- Most locations suffer from a skill and motivation problem: few staff know how to conduct audits, and low remuneration, especially for urban UPK, gives the job a “volunteer” feeling resulting in low motivation.
- The quality of reported data depends on the training and commitment of the UPK staff, with variations from office to office.
- The key areas of capacity building that must be addressed are delinquency management and the broad area of group management and supervision.
- Audits showed that the UPK do not always report the data they have accurately.
- UPK data show that profitability is good; but UPK reports omit all kinds of costs, including voluntary costs, facilitation, financial expenses, and accurate loan loss provisioning, and especially the costs of losses to corruption.
- The PNPM Rural technical manual includes a list of performance indicators, none of which appears to be used to inform decision-making.

The report recommends severing the RLF from PNPM, and converting it to one of several alternative legal footings: as a cooperative, a government-owned company, or some other form of organization under Indonesian law. The very best UPK should be launched immediately as independent financial institutions, while the next tier should be given 6-12 months of assistance to become independent—after being registered under a new legal framework. The lowest tier of performers should be shut down immediately and their resources reassigned. All participants in the RLF need both training and “hand-holding,” consistent on-the-job supervision and correction. Current training methods, such as lectures, must be reassessed. UPK should be brought into line with international microcredit best practices, starting with the reinforcement of accounting rules. The indicators used to measure UPK performance should be simplified, and the staff trained to track them accurately.

GOVERNANCE REVIEW OF PNPM RURAL: COMMUNITY LEVEL ANALYSIS

Andrea Woodhouse
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

In 2006, the Government announced that it would expand PNPM to cover the entire country. By 2009, PNPM had nearly quadrupled in size. As might be expected from any rapid scale-up, many elements of the program—including management and oversight mechanisms and staffing—struggled to keep pace.

Since 2009, supervision missions for PNPM have identified a rise in serious fraud and corruption cases, and problems with the quality of facilitation, participation, and other key elements at the community level. This Governance Review addresses the extent and causes of such problems, and offers recommendations for improvement.

The report finds governance problems in a number of categories: participation, transparency, information flows, corruption, marginalization, elite capture, and accountability. Often, problems on the ground are caused by issues higher up the chain:

- Political interference. PNPM institutions are vulnerable to capture by political actors, such as DPR members or sub-district heads who seize the process or direct its benefits for their own ends.
- Weak central oversight. When there is little chance of detection, facilitators face pressure to collude.
- The proliferation of PNPM offshoots and pilot programs has given facilitators an increasingly heavy administrative workload, preventing them from allocating more time to facilitation.

Some issues were caused by the rapid scale-up:

- The program is under intense pressure to disburse its funds, with oversight and accountability rendered secondary goals.
- Facilitators face unrealistic workloads: increased reporting burdens, and geographic areas that are too large or have too many villages to cover effectively.
- At this scale, effective oversight has been impossible.

The review recommends focusing on the core of the program: skilled facilitators who are free to do their jobs, with reliable accountability mechanisms. Community and Village Empowerment Directorate (Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa, or PMD) needs to clarify its vision, and rebuild the program’s design, implementation, and information management around that vision. To reduce corruption, PNPM should reduce the number of cash transactions, do more cross-audits, and involve CSOs in monitoring at the district level. PNPM should also offer legal assistance, both for the prosecution of corruption, and for the defense of embattled facilitators.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=5973
IMPROVING MANAGEMENT OF PNPM

Independent Research & Advisory Indonesia (IRAI) and PNPM Support Facility
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

At its inception in 1998, KDP assigned responsibility for policy, financing, monitoring, and audits to civil servants, while outsourcing technical and social facilitation to the private sector. Through massive changes—including decentralization and the maturation of Indonesia’s democratic institutions—the managerial arrangements for KDP, and later PNPM, remained basically unchanged. The purpose of this study was to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current system, and suggest reforms that might support a transition to a better PNPM in 2014.

Strengths:
- Even with a small, under-resourced, and under-trained staff at PMD, KDP and PNPM have functioned well.
- Communities involve themselves in problem solving.
- The system does disclose complaints and corruption cases.

Weaknesses:
- No online budget system, leading to delays, mountains of paperwork, and inefficient monitoring. The number of staff at PMD is too small to handle PNPM and all of its pilots without delays.
- Several large agencies besides PMD, including state agencies and the World Bank, are involved in program supervision, contributing to planning and implementation delays that can seriously affect outcomes.
- Information management is poor.
- The volume of complaints is higher than the system can bear, and guidelines for complaints resolution are not always clear.

The report suggests auditing the current MIS, and designing a new, integrated information system. Human resources management should be improved at the national level, where tasks and the skill-sets of the people in charge of those tasks are often mismatched. PNPM should develop a system capable of handling the volume of complaints the program receives. Facilitators, the backbone of PNPM, should be better recruited, better trained, subjected to regular assessments, and offered incentives to work in remote areas.

For eight years, from 2002 to 2010, both urban and rural poverty declined sharply across Indonesia; but as of 2010, 33 percent of urban dwellers (and 48 percent of the nation at large) were still living on less than USD2.00 PPP per day. Meanwhile, 37 percent of Indonesia's poor live in its cities, a number projected to rise as the country continues to urbanize.

This report uses the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) and the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) to analyze urban poverty, and to track the effectiveness and the targeting of programs aimed at the urban poor. It was one of two studies commissioned by the World Bank contributing to the larger review of PNPM Urban, Indonesia: Urban Poverty and Program Review report. The report finds that:

• Urban poverty has declined nationwide since 2002, and all sorts of indicators, from school enrolments to vaccinations, are on positive trends.
• In a rural sample, equal numbers of people crossed the poverty line in both directions. In the urban sample, more individuals became poor than rose from poverty, but the proportion of poor people who became non-poor was higher than in the nation at large.
• The urban poor prioritize employment and livelihoods over improving infrastructure.
• The percentage of households with female heads is actually slightly lower among the poor than the non-poor.
• Overall, targeting of poverty programs is better in cities than in rural areas, and better in Java than elsewhere. But even in cities, 30 percent of the poorest quintile received no subsidized rice from the Rice for the Poor (Raskin) program, and 62 percent do not have a community health insurance (Jamkesmas) card.
• No single characteristic, such as education level, employment type, or having a female household head, correlates strongly enough with poverty to guide targeting.

The report recommends standardizing and improving targeting practices across programs. More attention should be paid to social protection, to insure that households affected by a sudden shock—an illness, a disaster, a loss of income—do not fall below the poverty line.

The vast majority of PNPM funds are spent to build small-scale infrastructure in rural areas. This report asks basic questions about the quality and usefulness of that infrastructure, and about the planning and management behind it. A team of seven engineers and an architect, accompanied by social sector, financial management, and safeguard specialists, evaluated PNPM infrastructure in 12 provinces, each carefully selected to ensure a wide geographic coverage across Indonesia and to include both ‘poor’ and ‘less poor’ provinces. The evaluation found that:

- 82 percent of projects reviewed were of high quality, and 14 percent acceptable quality, while 4 percent of projects were deemed to have failed.
- PNPM projects are 15 to 25 percent cheaper on average than similar projects funded and managed by government line ministries.
- All indicators were either roughly equal to, or better than, where they were at the last evaluation in 2007.
- There are not nearly enough technical facilitators, and without their help certain projects, especially dams, can end up posing dangers.

The report stresses that villages are unlikely to plan for maintenance without guidance from project facilitators. Facilitators also need to ensure that land issues are resolved and documented before any construction begins.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6774

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Infrastruktur PNPM Mandiri Perdesaan Laporan Evaluasi Teknis 2012 : Laporan Akhir Temuan dan Rekomendasi

Microeconomic research shows that when women participate in the institutions and processes around them, outcomes improve. This report investigates the roles of women in PNPM: their engagement in all levels of the process, the status of the women who do participate, the fate of proposals advanced by women, and whether those projects actually meet women’s expressed needs. The report finds that:

- Quality of participation is mixed, and still not optimal. Women are far more active in the early stages—socialization and needs assessment—than in the later stages, such as planning and management.
- Facilitators are not being trained effectively on gender issues, and hiring guidelines are not bringing on enough female facilitators.
- When asked about their priorities, women tend to ask for training. But in PNPM, the projects proposed by women that actually receive funding tend to be infrastructure, such as water systems.
- Local strategies for gender inclusion exist, but have not made it into practice.

The report recommends hiring gender specialists at the national level, with a budget, the authority to collect data on women’s participation and supervise gender-related activities, and the means to share knowledge. A network of gender-focused facilitators should be placed in districts across the country. PNPM’s technical guidelines should be revised to include gender in social mapping, integrate good practices identified in a 2003 assessment of KDP, and establish women-only meetings, with no men present. Facilitator training should include basic gender awareness.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7078

http://bit.ly/1FzOale
PNPM PEDULI – ONE YEAR ON: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED

Donna Leigh Holden, Edwar Fitri, Meuthia Ganie-Rochman, Rima Irmayani, Early Dewi Nuriana
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

PNPM Peduli was launched by the Government based on the perception that many people or community groups do not have as equal access to opportunity and services as others. These marginalized groups are usually the recipients of various stigma and negative stereotyping because of differences in social circumstances, identity, occupation or sexual orientation. For example, these include among others: lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) groups, sex workers, people living with HIV/AIDS and leprosy, customary communities, street children, child labors, etc.

Various international studies show that CSOs have comparative advantages in reaching out to these groups and working together with them to improve their socio-economic conditions. PNPM Peduli works with 72 CSOs at the national and regional levels by channeling grants to implement various sub-projects with the marginalized groups that support local economic development, access to legal documentation, access to health and education services, advocacy for rights and social justice, social inclusion, and reconciliation. In addition to grants, PNPM Peduli also provides capacity building in advocacy, and basic education and health services, as well as innovative poverty reduction activities. This review lays out lessons learned from the first year of the project.

• PNPM Peduli has built networks and systems to support ongoing development, as well as provide an effective approach to understand and reach out and empower marginalized groups in Indonesia
• Although the program’s logic appears solid and its objectives seem relevant, the program's achievements can be strengthened by improving targeting or focusing on specific issues/geographic coverage/target groups.
• Throughout implementation, there has been good progress in terms of social inclusion. In several cases, beneficiaries appreciated the positive changes in improved awareness, self-confidence, social networks and bargaining power.

The review finds that PNPM Peduli’s concept is sound, but suggests that a new, clearer vision statement would help to clarify the roles of each partner and ensure that everyone is working towards the same goals. A programmatic approach is needed to avoid current issues with fragmented program’s components and sub-projects. In addition, partnerships in PNPM Peduli should be based on existing experience and organizational capacity using proven approaches.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

PNPM Peduli Satu Tahun Berjalan: Evaluasi Independen Atas Hasil Pembelajaran (Oktober 2012)

PNPM RURAL IMPACT EVALUATION

John Voss  
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

This paper gauges the impacts of PNPM Rural on household welfare, poverty, access to services, employment, social dynamics, and governance. Survey questions covered household consumption, housing conditions, health care, pre-natal care, education, employment, income, social dynamics, and governance. The report also draws on the national census (Susenas) on topics such as land size, water supply, and available infrastructure. Key findings include:

• PNPM was linked to higher real per capita consumption and a higher likelihood of escaping poverty, as well as better access to outpatient health services and better chances of employment.
• Households from disadvantaged or marginalized groups (where the head of the household is female or has a low level of education) received fewer benefits than others.
• PNPM scored well on measures of social capital and governance within the program itself, but these benefits did not spill over into other village decision-making processes.
• Impacts are strongest for the poorest households, as well as households in poorer sub-districts and places with significant infrastructure gaps, where the interests of the poor and non-poor are aligned.

The report recommends that block grants be targeted towards areas with low levels of infrastructure. Facilitators should emphasize maintenance and sustainability, and continue to try innovative approaches to include marginalized groups in the PNPM process. More research is needed to understand why PNPM’s governance mechanisms have not spurred community demand for greater participation and transparency from government generally.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=6299

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Evaluasi Dampak PNPM Perdesaan

RAPID APPRAISAL OF PNPM NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT (AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION PARTNERSHIP GRANT MECHANISM)

Nina Schuler, Risye Dwiyani
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

The PNPM Urban Neighborhood Development (ND) pilot significantly increases the size of the PNPM Urban grant, and introduces some new components: spatial planning and area prioritization. This rapid appraisal was designed to offer a snapshot of a particular moment in the process. The findings suggest:

• The project does best in locations with a Community Self-Help Group (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat, or BKM, also referred to as a Community Trust), an engaged local government, and generally simple infrastructure needs.
• Strategic spatial plans are too complex: they fail to help the community to understand its neighborhood, or how to advocate with local government.
• Spatial plans quickly become obsolete.
• Many proposed ND plans are abandoned before they can be put into practice, due to time and facilitation constraints.
• Governments often do not have the budget flexibility to respond to infrastructure requests from urban districts (kelurahan).
• Community leaders and PNPM facilitators and consultants often believe that the poor are entrenched in "slum-like" behavior.
• Facilitators want more guidance on the meaning of "slum upgrading," and perhaps a closed menu of program options (i.e., paving, sanitation, waste management, water, housing improvement, market improvement) to focus community proposals.

The report recommends simplifying the design tools, and either limiting the menu of projects that ND will fund, or running proposals through a more stringent selection process. The program needs a better method for identifying target communities, perhaps by focusing on districts with a high density of urban poor, or that are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. The program needs better monitoring in order to ensure that it is not duplicating or displacing government spending, as well as better reporting, so that lessons learned can be used to improve the program.

THE IMPACT OF PNPM RURAL: EAST JAVA – WEST SUMATRA – SOUTHEAST SULAWESI

Muhammad Syukri, Sulton Mawardi, Akhmadi
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

This report compares qualitative data from 2012 to a baseline study conducted in 2007. Main research topic included the PNPM Rural process, including participation, transparency, and relations with local government; the dynamics of poverty in rural areas; and access to public services, and the quality of those services. Key findings included:

- Participation, accountability, and transparency were strong within PNPM, but this did not lead the community to demand these things from the village administration.
- The “open menu” is almost always used for infrastructure, which seldom matches well with the needs of the poorest people.
- Participation is high, but “instrumental” and often of low quality. Female participation is high, but does not reduce male domination of the process.
- Representation systems did not always bring aspirations up, or information down.
- In some areas poverty increased: where productivity was damaged by environmental pollution, and where industrial mechanization had reduced the size of the workforce.
- Targeted programs such as unconditional cash transfers (BLT), Rice for the Poor (Raskin), and community health insurance (Jamkesmas) contributed a great deal in preventing the poor from becoming poorer. Targeting was handled by elites, without participation or transparency.
- Rather than award funds to the proposals that succeed in a competitive process, villages prefer to split funds evenly between all competing groups.

The report concludes by emphasizing the importance of facilitators: to socialize the program and its open menu, to adapt program processes to local conditions, and to make PNPM more inclusive and ensure that the priorities of the poor are met. To reach this goal, more facilitators should be hired, and the administrative workload placed on them should be reduced. Facilitators should be overseen by a body with the authority to see that PNPM procedures are followed properly. PNPM should consider targeting agriculture, perhaps through changes in program design.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Laporan Penelitian Studi Kualitatif Dampak PNPM Perdesaan: Jawa Timur, Sumatera Barat, Sulawesi Tenggara

EVALUATION OF PNPM RESPEK: VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Yulia Indrawati Sari, Harmein Rahman, Dewi Ratna Sjari Manaf

Published by: AKATIGA for PNPM Support Facility

This study evaluates the implementation of PNPM RESPEK, a program supported jointly by PNPM and the special autonomy funds of Papua and West Papua. PNPM RESPEK began in 2008, and during the evaluation period reached 87 percent of the villages in Papua and West Papua. About 70 percent of PNPM RESPEK funding was spent on infrastructure. This study looks at the quality of those projects, whether they worked, how the infrastructure were being utilized, and their impact on villages.

- Infrastructure built through PNPM RESPEK was 60 percent cheaper than infrastructure built by comparable government projects.
- General participation is very weak and most ordinary people are still poorly informed. The very poor are not invited to, or made aware of, meetings and their participation is generally pro-forma or non-existent. The main contribution of the poor is labor.
- Most infrastructure is used by only an elite segment within the community, and not by the community at large. This is often caused by elite domination in planning processes that is exacerbated by weak facilitation. Only about one third of RESPEK infrastructure reviewed was both of good quality and effectively used.
- Facilitators are often required to cover vast territories and visit nearly inaccessible villages. Hence this adversely influenced the quality of facilitation.
- Community monitoring is most common when a village contains more than one powerful clan.

The report recommends a serious, long-term effort to recruit and train local facilitators, perhaps along the lines of the World Bank’s “barefoot engineers” program. RESPEK should design incentives for facilitators to improve their capacity to empower marginalized groups, prevent elite capture, and communicate effectively. In villages where facilitators are unable to visit often, these remote communities should be allowed to combine two years’ budget into a single, two-year project cycle. Facilitators should focus on particular groups, such as mothers or children, to create space for non-elite projects.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Laporan Final Evaluasi PNPM RESPEK: Infrastruktur Pedesaan dan Kapasitas Kelembagaan

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SPADA PLANNING AND SERVICE DELIVERY

The PATTIRO Institute
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA) is a complement to PNPM in disadvantaged and conflict areas, with a special focus on governance at the community and district levels. SPADA is designed to combine participatory and technocratic planning, align local plans with district ones, and give some training to government officials. This report draws some lessons from SPADA’s implementation:

• SPADA has improved basic services, primarily through paying for items that were not covered by the district budget: unfunded government projects, unfunded community projects, and projects proposed by neither the government nor communities but suggested by research or brainstorming.
• District-level planning is subject to government “interventions”, enabled by a lack of community oversight.
• District assemblies (DPRD) are a vulnerable link: legislators want more control to integrate all state budgeting under their own supervision, but have not been involved in line ministry activities in the past, and are generally uninformed about the budgets and projects of line ministries in their districts.

The report recommends positioning the district development planning (Bappeda) as the leading coordinator of all poverty projects, and engaging with the DPRD to synchronize and monitor development programs.

The Pro-Poor Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring program (P3BM), put in place by the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), comprises four parts: (i) an MDG scorecard, (ii) poverty mapping, (iii) checking district budgets (APBD) to see whether they are pro-poor, and (iv) an instrument to help local governments choose the most needed sub-district projects. P3BM signed districts up, trained the trainers to go to visit the districts, and gave some technical assistance on pro-poor planning and budgeting. This rapid assessment was commissioned by PSF to examine the benefits of the program, weaknesses in its implementation, and the lessons it might offer PNPM and other poverty programs.

- With committed leadership at the district level, P3BM can help target the poor and set the budget properly.
- P3BM requires considerable work to implement, but staff are frequently rotated out and there is no incentive to adopt the program properly.
- Some districts face ongoing technical issues with their databases and need constant assistance.
- CSOs have been helpful in developing and using these tools.

The report recommends establishing regulatory support for the program, starting with a joint Circular Letter from Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Home Affairs, to mobilize the resources needed to make P3BM work properly. A special secretariat should be set up in each province to move the districts towards MGD goals. At the local level, positions should be established to supply P3BM information to line ministries (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, or SKPD), representative assemblies (DPRD), and village planning meetings (Musrenbang). The program should offer intensive technical assistance to the districts for two years, and should extend training to universities, CSOs, and PNPM stakeholders.


**English version:**

Executive Summary Lessons Learned from the Pro-Poor Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring Program (P3BM): A Rapid Assessment in Nine Districts http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7070
P2SPP/PNPM INTEGRATION LESSONS LEARNED STUDY IN SIX DISTRICTS

Suahirman, Rianingsih Djohani
Published by: PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

P2SPP (Program Pembangunan Sistem Perencanaan Partisipatif or the Participatory System Development Program, renamed PNPM Integrasi in 2006) was designed to help integrate community planning into the larger scheme of technocratic government planning. The program gave grants at the district level to fund projects at the sub-district level that had been proposed in PNPM meetings at the village level, tying the three levels together. This study examines the interactions between PNPM’s participatory planning process, and the plans of government line ministries.

- Community proposals are reaching district planners, but there is not much evidence that government planning is actually becoming any more responsive to community needs.
- Planning is fragmented horizontally (between villages, which do not know what each other are doing) and vertically (because villages do not know what the districts are doing).
- Local government technical agencies (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, or SKPD) still resist village proposals for a couple of reasons:
  - Village proposals are not standardized.
  - They are inconsistent with the district plan.
  - They are too small for district agencies.
  - Mandatory programs from above use up most of the money, leaving little for proposals from below.
- *Setrawan* (public servants charged with promoting community empowerment) have a weak position in government, in part because they are temporary. They have not always been successful in bridging community priorities and SKPD.
- P2SPP created social networks among stakeholders beyond the village level, with the potential to promote community priorities at the district level.
- Policy advocacy through ‘multi-stakeholder dialogues’ garnered the commitment of local governments to make and implement innovations.

The report recommends clarifying the legal relationship between community and government planning processes. Dedicated task forces in each sub-district should share information freely and promptly, including sending sub-district budgets and plans to villages before community planning meetings. All village funding sources should be consolidated into a single budget. *Setrawan* should be made permanent, and embedded in the offices of the district PMD and SKPD section heads. The Inter-village Cooperation Board (BKAD) should bridge communities, SKPD, and district assemblies (DPRD).

This process evaluation looks at the current phase of PNPM Urban and the pilot Neighborhood Development (ND) scheme, asks whether project objectives are being reached, and extracts some best practices and lessons learned for the future:

- Communities are happy with PNPM Urban infrastructure, which is generally of high-quality.
- Female participation in the implementation of infrastructure projects consists mostly of providing workers with snacks and drinks.
- The urban poor tend to be geographically spread out, making it hard to classify any given area as “high poverty.”
- There appears to be little duplication of activities or priorities, in large part because most areas incorporate PNPM Urban into the development planning meeting (Musrenbang).
- Involved facilitators consistently improve the quality of projects. But facilitators are overworked and overextended; and the practice of rotating facilitators disrupts their ability to meet community needs.
- The most cited attributes of successful facilitators are their personal characteristics, experience and training. Effective facilitators tirelessly promote the program and build community capacity, rather than solely enforcing rules.
- Auditing is key to limiting or preventing the misuse of funds.

The evaluation recommends improving the management information system (MIS), which is relied upon for auditing, but often contains poor data. ND funding dedicated to marketing was proving to be ineffective and should be reduced.
INDONESIA’S PNPM GENERASI PROGRAM: FINAL IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT

Benjamin A. Olken, Junko Onishi, Susan Wong
Published by: The World Bank

This report describes the findings from three waves of evaluation: a baseline survey, a midpoint survey after 15-18 months of project implementation, and a final evaluation after 27-30 months. The third and final round gathered responses from 45,000 household members, village heads, and school and health facility staff. The evaluation also includes findings from a qualitative study in 12 villages in West Java and East Nusa Tenggara. Main findings include:

- PNPM Generasi had a statistically significant positive impact on average across the 12 indicators it was designed to address, with its greatest impact in areas with low baseline health and education indicators.
- PNPM Generasi demonstrated that a national CDD architecture can be adapted to other uses.
- The main long-term impact was a decrease in malnutrition. Childhood malnutrition was reduced by 2.2 percent, about a 10 percent reduction from the control level. Reductions in malnutrition were strongest in areas with higher initial malnutrition rates, most notably in East Nusa Tenggara province, where underweight rates were reduced by 8.8 percent, a 20 percent decline compared with control areas.
- Surprisingly, in Java, there was a negative impact on stunting and severe stunting, which needs to be explored further.
- Education indicators improved in the final evaluation, following the zero or negative impacts found at the interim evaluation.
- In terms of the longer-term education learning outcomes, the program did not improve childhood test scores as yet.
- Performance incentives improved program effectiveness in health but not in education; a host of contingent reasons may explain why that was the case, and further research and testing will be needed to see if incentives can impact education indicators.
- Incentive rules were sometimes difficult for communities to understand.

The report suggests that future expansion of PNPM Generasi should prioritize areas where its 12 key indicators are lagging, and not necessarily areas identified as poor. The Government may wish to see how incentives can work in other lagging areas, e.g., poverty programs or access to water and sanitation; these interventions and incentives must be properly monitored and evaluated. PNPM Generasi should regularly review its 12 target indicators and consider whether they should be complemented or replaced. A follow-up evaluation may be needed in the future to examine the longer-term sustainability of interventions and impacts.

MARGINALIZED GROUPS IN PNPM RURAL

AKATIGA
Published by: AKATIGA for PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

This study grew out of concern that certain segments of society were being left out of the development planning process in PNPM Rural. Previous studies indicated that decision-making within the project favored the majority and those who were better-off as opposed to poorer villagers and those living in outlying areas. This study was undertaken to better understand the socio-economic and political dynamics of participation and marginalization. The report finds that:

In relation to PNPM Rural participation (or non-participation), generally there are four major groups:

- The elite are the wealthy, village government leaders, religious and customary leaders.
- Activists are villagers who possess knowledge of government projects and use this knowledge to become involved. These activists, such as those in farmers' groups and Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) (government-led women's group), have a close relationship with government leaders. Together, elites and activists dominate decision-making, including in women’s meetings.
- The majority are people with few assets or small income levels, such as small landowners, motorcycle taxi drivers, small industry workers and mobile vendors.
- Marginalized groups have no (valuable) assets, live in outlying areas with limited basic infrastructure, have limited income with a large number of dependents, and originate from an ethnic/religious minority. Poverty alone does not mean marginalization.

PNPM’s rapid scale-up in 2009 led to a series of problems that contributed to marginalization:

- Facilitators lack the skills to advance the empowerment agenda.
- A program-wide focus on administration over empowerment.
- Monitoring and evaluation has become mechanistic, and qualitative monitoring has suffered. Data on participation numbers are collected, but data on participation quality are not.
- Delays in disbursement severely damage faith in the program.
- Late funds are often put to uses other than those in the original proposal.

The report recommends giving PNPM a more specific sectoral focus—rural infrastructure—that can be more easily administered and more effectively facilitated. Selecting projects by plebiscite would reduce reliance on facilitators to elicit the voices of the poor in large village discussions. Proposals should be weighted to favor hamlets (dusun) with smaller populations and those farther from the village center. Facilitators should organize marginalized groups, but the program should not offer those groups special benefits, focusing instead on “leveling the playing field.”


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Kelompok Marjinal dalam PNPM Perdesaan

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=4444
PNPM gives priority to poorer villages, and then assumes that those villages have the resources to maintain the assets they build, or assumes that they are willing to use those resources for maintenance. This study examines these assumptions. Do villages have the resources? Are villages willing to spend the resources on maintenance? What are the characteristics of villages that can and will maintain their infrastructure? The report finds that:

- The labor and money needed to maintain village infrastructure constitute a kind of tax. While the sums may be small, they can be difficult to collect, and the effect on the poor can be burdensome.
- Willingness to contribute, however, is high.
- Labor on village infrastructure is undervalued, leading the poor to carry a proportionately higher burden of the cost of maintenance.

Most villages do not maintain their infrastructure, but villages that do:

- Had received responses to complaints about quality.
- Had received more information from PNPM and village leadership on the use of project funds.
- Had received the village allocation fund (ADD) in a timely fashion.

The report recommends that village infrastructure maintenance be assigned to specific roles in village and local governments. District governments should begin transitioning funds away from upgrades and into maintenance, and all new infrastructure projects should include maintenance plans.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Kapasitas Desa Dalam Memelihara Infrastruktur Bukti dari Pedesaan Indonesia Nopember 2010

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=4443
COMMUNITY-BASED REINTEGRATION IN ACEH: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF BRA-KDP

Patrick Barron, Macartan Humphreys, Laura Paler, Jeremy Weinstein
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This paper evaluates the Community-Based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims program (BRA-KDP), an innovative attempt by local and central governments to employ lessons learned from successful past community-development work to post-conflict Aceh. This paper uses data from the Aceh Reintegration Livelihood Surveys (ARLS) to ask how well the program worked, what its impacts were, and why CDD projects unfolded as they did. Key findings include:

- Overall, the program was only marginally better at reaching conflict victims than non-victims.
- BRA-KDP is associated with strong gains in welfare and improvements in perceptions of well being.
- The participation of villages is associated with an 11-point decline in the share classified as “poor” by village heads.
- The evidence for improvements in social cohesion or relations between citizens and the state is weak.
- There is no evidence that BRA-KDP increased villages’ capacity for collective problem solving.

The authors caution that structural differences between BRA-KDP locations and control communities make meaningful comparisons difficult. To overcome these biases, the report relies on an array of statistical methods that may appear overly complex. They also point out that BRA-KDP raises two issues inherent in CDD. First, given full control of project money, communities in Aceh chose to bypass the kinds of processes that build social cohesion. Second, while the empowerment and institutions built up by CDD may create conditions for peace in the long run, in the short term CDD causes interest groups to compete for limited resources, and can contribute to social divisions.

DELIVERING ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES: THE BRA-KDP PROGRAM IN ACEH

Adrian Morel, Makiko Watanabe, Robert Wrobel
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This look at the Community-Based Reintegration Assistance for Conflict Victims program (BRA-KDP), an innovative attempt by local and central governments to employ lessons learned from successful past community-development work to post-conflict Aceh, complements “Community-Based Reintegration in Aceh: Assessing the Impacts of BRA-KDP” (2009) with additional data from BRA-KDP’s Monitoring Information Supervision (MIS) system, from supervision missions, and from qualitative fieldwork. Key findings include:

• Community targeting of beneficiaries worked well overall.
• Participation was strong, even among vulnerable groups such as conflict victims and women.
• Ex-combatants affected the program in both positive and negative ways, contingent on local histories and conditions.
• BRA-KDP had positive effects on welfare, and demonstrated that with the right delivery system, funds intended as compensation can impact development.
• 89 percent of program funds were spent on livelihoods activities, not on public goods—a stark contrast to KDP in the rest of the country.

A few modifications could have helped the project work better:

• Linking BRA-KDP clearly to the obligations defined in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding.
• Better training for facilitators.
• Linking small livelihoods projects to outside sources of capital and technical assistance.

The report recommends that future targeting not rely on conflict-era identities, but on standard indicators such as welfare and education levels.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=2696
This study looks closely at “micro-infrastructure” projects built by KDP (here called by its Indonesian name, Program Pemgembangan Kecamatan, or PPK) between 1999 and 2007, to see how they hold up. Are they still working? Are they still being maintained? The study assumes that everything was designed and built to be fully functional, which may not always be the case.

- Of 657 projects examined, 72 percent were of good quality, 21 percent were partially functional, and 7 percent were not functional. Almost one third of non-functioning projects were due to a broken pump, motor, or generator, most of which had been of low quality to begin with.
- Functioning projects tend to decline over time, suggesting problems with design, construction, or maintenance that eventually show themselves.
- Poor planning and information-sharing lead communities and government line ministries to replicate each other’s projects.
- Villages do not plan for maintenance.

The report recommends reducing future maintenance issues as much as possible, by buying better equipment and making sure that local operators know how to repair equipment when it breaks down. Alternative energy sources, such as solar and hydro, reduce reliance on fossil fuels, an important cost saving. Communities should be provided with constant guidance and support, and monitored to make sure that the initial designs are as good as possible, community contributions are collected, and maintenance is provided for.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=2272
Decisions in CDD programs, including KDP and PNPM, are often made in forums attended by community delegates, and not by the general population, raising concerns about the possibility of elite capture. To investigate this question, this paper compares two different methods of project selection in KDP: by representatives, or by plebiscites. The paper finds that:

- The different methods had little impact on the types of projects selected, but a large effect on measures of satisfaction and on the willingness of the community to contribute time or money.
- Women's projects determined by plebiscite were more likely to be located in poor areas.
- The mixed-gender process yielded male preferences.
- The difference in the time cost was enormous: voting takes 10 minutes, while seeking consensus takes three hours.
- There was no evidence of vote-buying.

While cautioning that this was only a short-term study, the paper suggests that making decisions by plebiscite may not change the projects selected, but has a large impact on satisfaction, and lends greater legitimacy to the process.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=7074
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14123
IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN INDONESIA

John Voss
Published by: The World Bank

This quantitative evaluation asks whether KDP2 increased household welfare, moved households out of poverty, increased access to education, health services, and employment, and benefited poor and disadvantaged groups. The evaluation finds that:

- Real per capita consumption gains were 11 percent higher for poor households in KDP areas than in control areas.
- Consumption gains in sub-districts in the poorest quintile were 5 percent higher than in control areas.
- The proportion of households moving out of poverty in poor sub-districts was 9.2 percent higher than in control areas. The proportion of households falling into poverty was 4.5 percent lower than in control areas.
- The proportion of household heads gaining access to outpatient care was 11.5 percent higher than in control areas.
- KDP2 reduced unemployment by 1.5 percent.
- In less-poor sub-districts, the average household saw either no benefits, or negative impacts.
- Disadvantaged groups, such as households headed by women or people with low education, are less likely to benefit from the program.

The report emphasizes the poor results in less-poor sub-districts, suggesting that KDP should change its strategy in these areas. Key to this change should be a greater focus on ensuring that benefits reach marginalized groups, including women and people with low levels of education. The report recommends that the next round of research focuses on social dynamics and governance, and includes a survey for individuals, and not just for households.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=1447
http://bit.ly/1Fzl7I9
MICRO CREDIT STRATEGY FORMULATION MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT PROGRAM OR PROGRAM NASIONAL PEMBERDAYAAN MASYARAKAT (PNPM)

Yayasan MICRA
Published by: Yayasan MICRA for PNPM Support Facility – World Bank, Jakarta

The microfinance sector in Indonesia is one of the largest in the world, with over 20,000 microfinance institutions (MFI) serving more than 15 million Indonesians. Despite this, at least 40 million more people in Indonesia still lack access to financial services, either because they live out of the reach of the formal financial sector, or because they are considered unbankable. This report assesses the current micro-credit arrangements attached to KDP and UPP, and outlines a strategy to improve those arrangements for PNPM. Key findings include:

- There is a demand for more micro-credit: KDP/UPP is serving 6.8 million people.
- This success comes despite inadequate policies, procedures, training, and product pricing.
- The KDP/UPP micro-credit system is not legally certified as an MFI. This lack of legal status prevents the program from including a savings component.
- Current human resources management and evaluation are rudimentary. Neither KDP nor UPP sets clear targets or effectively measures performance. Well-trained field staff are critical to the quality, success and sustainability of both programs, but most staff have limited experience managing micro-credit programs.
- Fieldwork revealed high staff turnover due to fraud and corruption, related mainly to the lack of control and capacity of the Inter-village Discussion Forum (Musyawarah Antar Desa, or MAD).
- The data used by UPK—the arrears rate, amount past due—overstate the quality of the portfolio. International best practice recommended a maximum of 5 percent portfolio at risk (PAR) as good for micro-credit.
- Community targeting distributes loans based on a sense that the recipient is deserving and in need, and not on the quality of the recipient’s plan or ability to repay.

The report suggests five options for the future, all of which include separating micro-credit from other grant-based programming, and adding a savings component, the cornerstone of effective, sustainable microfinance.

- Executing program credit through banks.
- Linking community groups to banks.
- Devolving ownership and management to village level.
- Leading the formation of cooperatives (Badan Usaha Milik Sesa or BUMDES).
- Giving a supervising financial institution ownership or (at least) a profit stake in the new microfinance institutions.

http://bit.ly/1K7oE7w
2006 VILLAGE SURVEY IN ACEH: AN ASSESSMENT OF VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

KDP
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

Three decades of conflict and the earthquake and tsunami of December 26, 2004 have had a devastating impact on the physical and social fabric of Aceh. To provide an accurate overview of the current condition of Acehnese villages, KDP undertook an assessment of the infrastructure status and the social situation throughout the province, covering almost every rural village in Aceh. The report found:

• Poverty is widespread throughout the province.
• Over 50 percent of infrastructure is damaged, either by conflict (19.5 percent), natural disaster (38.6 percent), or lack of maintenance (41.9 percent). The total cost of replacing all this infrastructure would come to USD1.3 billion.
• Major investment is still required in Aceh; between the tsunami, the conflict, and years of neglect, total infrastructure repair costs could be as high as IDR 20 trillion, or USD2.2 billion.
• More households are reported displaced by conflict than by the tsunami, and conflict IDPs are returning at a lower rate.
• Conflict IDPs are perceived to be considerably worse off economically than tsunami IDPs.
• “Social capital” is high: Aceh’s exclusion level is low, and village meetings are regarded as the primary problem-solving mechanism.
• Community-driven processes are the most effective method for targeting investment.

According to the report, while a return to conflict appears remote, a variety of indicators suggest that problems may lie not far beneath the surface. Efforts to support the post-conflict peace-building process should continue, and should include: ongoing socialization of public services and the peace process; equipping local leaders with accurate and up-to-date information on reintegration programs; and improving security. Community-driven processes are most effective in targeting investment, but special attention should be paid to ensuring that all members of the community—particularly women, who are under-represented in the decision-making process in Aceh—have the opportunity to participate in, and contribute to, local development processes.


http://bit.ly/1ySgGht

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Survei Desa Aceh 2006 : Evaluasi Keadaan Prasarana dan Sosial Desa

GENDER IN COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PNPM STRATEGY

World Bank Group, Washington DC
Published by: World Bank

As a national program, reaching nearly every corner of the country, PNPM provides a unique opportunity to engage with issues of gender and inequality. This report reviews the role of gender in KDP, the Urban Poverty Program (UPP), and several other projects.

- Gender training is more likely to have an impact when it appears in government guidelines. Flexible approaches are needed to reach women. Separate meetings help, but may marginalize women from the mixed-gender process.
- Program procedures entrench elite women in positions of authority.
- Local cultural factors define women's roles.
- Few staff are sufficiently gender-aware, but those who are have a significant impact.
- Affirmative action is more effective at lower levels.
- There is only anecdotal evidence that female facilitators are more effective at empowering women.
- Women's savings and credit groups rarely include the poorest, unless explicitly required by the program.

The report recommends achieving a broad consensus on goals for gender equality, based around three areas of empowerment: economic, political, and social. Controlled experiments could help determine which kinds of program design offer women the best chance of achieving positions of responsibility. Male leaders must be offered gender training. Most female facilitators are of childbearing age; HR should accommodate their need for maternal leave, etc., so they do not have to leave their jobs to have children.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=1111

http://bit.ly/1bkF6W5

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Ringkasan Eksekutif Kajian Gender dalam Proyek Pembangunan Berbasis Komunitas: Implikasi bagi PNPM Mandiri

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=1112
KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM QUALITATIVE IMPACT EVALUATION

Karrie McLaughlin, Adam Satu, Michael Hoppe
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

KDP was designed around principles of transparency and accountability, partly in the hope that by exposing communities to these ideas the program would spur a grassroots demand for better services, not just within KDP’s own process, but from government more generally. This qualitative impact evaluation asks whether that spillover happened, whether KDP was able to change government practices, and whether it increased villager capacity to more adequately identify and solve community development needs, or to assert themselves in the economic, political and social decisions that affect their lives. The study also examined KDP’s impact on community institutions, women’s ability to meet their development needs and poverty reduction. Some key findings include:

- KDP supports good governance with training and support, but concrete change is hard to find. KDP encourages community pressure to improve governance, but this more often leads to conflict than progress.
- KDP does an excellent job of alleviating poverty at the village level, but does so by helping everyone, not by targeting poorer groups.
- The strongest factor in the success of KDP is the support of the village head.
- Systems that send representatives to meetings, instead of opening them to the general public, can obscure elite domination.
- The capacity for collective action is strongest at the hamlet (dusun) level. Competition for resources by different dusun within a village can be fierce.
- KDP is better at supporting existing institutions than starting new ones, except ones founded to receive KDP benefits.
- Women’s involvement follows regional patterns, with little impact from KDP. The existence of women-only programs can end up excluding women from mixed-gender programs.

The report recommends engaging more strongly at the hamlet level, which is the natural unit of solidarity. KDP should offer training to village heads, so that they understand their place within KDP. The village consultative body (Badan Perwakilan Desa, or BPD) should be turned back into an elected body, to effectively balance the village head.

THE EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY IMPACT OF PNPM

Gustav F. Papanek
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

One of PNPM’s major benefits is its ability to create employment, primarily for poor, unskilled workers. This paper estimates the program’s impact on employment and income for 2007 to 2010, and analyzes the circumstances under which the effect could be larger or smaller.

• By 2009, PNPM benefited roughly 24 million workers, increasing their incomes by 10 to 14 percent for 60 days of work.
• Some 6 million families escaped poverty; another 10 million received some additional income, but not enough to escape poverty.
• The impact of PNPM is especially important because:
  o Provides work and income when few other jobs are available:
    * down-times in agricultural cycles
    * following natural disasters
    * following local economic set-backs
  o Can respond to need, adding to the social safety net.
• The number of poor depends as much or more on:
  o The price of rice and other basic foods.
  o Jobs created elsewhere in the economy.
  o How many are benefited by conditional cash transfers.
• PNPM’s impact is limited because:
  • It provides supplementary employment, not full-time regular jobs. Many calculations assume that PNPM will provide 21 days of work. Landless and land-poor agricultural workers need at least 60 days a year.
  • PNPM creates few jobs for professional, technical, and other middle-class workers.
  • PNPM employment cannot help families that have no one in the labor force.
  • Reasons for the small impact of the urban program:
    o The urban component is expected to employ only one-third as many workers as the rural component.
    o UPP grants are made for one year, whereas KDP grants last for 3-5 years

The report argues that PNPM should be an essential part of the social safety net, increasing its investments and creating more employment in areas that are especially poor or have suffered temporary downturns.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=3114
This paper is about the genesis of KDP, with a focus on the opportunities and constraints that challenge social scientists working within large development bureaucracies. The first section of the paper describes the project and the specific historical factors that led to an experiment such as KDP. The second section gives a brief overview of KDP’s ethnographic roots. The final section asks how the vocabulary of development can be expanded to include the critical insights of social scientists. Some main points:

- KDP was produced at a moment when three institutions were in crisis:
  - the New Order government, which was collapsing in the wake of the Southeast Asian monetary crisis;
  - the World Bank, which was undergoing a crisis of legitimacy after a review of its involuntary resettlement policy and revelations about the extent of its knowledge of corruption in Indonesia; and
  - Indonesian villages, where state-building and the Village Law of 1979 had undermined traditional sources of authority.

- The findings of the World Bank’s Local Level Institution (LLI) studies challenged development conventions:
  - community-owned projects functioned better than government ones, with better participation of women and the poor, and higher community contributions;
  - community organizations were long-lived and served multiple purposes, and had strategies for challenging leadership and resolving disputes;
  - community organizations thrived when given access to funds with clear regulations and left alone; and
  - village-level problems could be resolved by officials at the sub-district level, or by reaching out to CSOs.

- These findings suggested that an effective project was not something that delivered a particular product, but a process that helps villagers solve self-identified problems.

- Social researchers needed to translate those findings into a language that could be grasped by the World Bank and government officials in charge of development. For that, the field visits and the language of “social capital” proved to be key.

- The idea of historical process had to be introduced to World Bank analyses of local politics and local economies. Very few people, for example, realized the extent to which Indonesian villages are the creation of a 1979 law on village structure.
The paper concludes by arguing that KDP is a product of a particular set of histories. As a result of KDPs rootedness in Indonesia’s historical context, proposals to “replicate” or “scale-up” the model should be treated with great caution. Second, a development project such as KDP can contribute towards a re-ordering of local political relationships. KDP’s underlying premise has been that villagers learn about democracy by practicing it.


http://bit.ly/1GcKRTc


http://bit.ly/1AfHlQi
LOCAL CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Patrick Barron, Rachel Diprose, Michael Woolcock
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

Development projects and conflict inevitably go hand in hand, because development is an inherently political and contested process. This study examines questions relating to development projects and different forms of local conflict by examining how KDP interacts with social tensions and local conflict, and how it affects the nature and extent of local conflict management. What are the strengths and limitations of projects such as KDP in an unstable social and political environment, where identities, rules, and group relations are being reconfigured, where long-standing grievances have the space to surface, and where access to power is being renegotiated? Can outside interventions such as KDP support progressive social change in this type of dynamic environment and, if so, how?

• KDP forums, facilitators, and complaints mechanisms deal with conflict related to the program, but KDP has little impact on aggregate conflict or on non-project-related conflict.
• Staying removed from conflict allows KDP to remain a politically neutral space.
• Non-project conflicts addressed through KDP tend to be resolved successfully. This shows a potential for KDP to play a larger mediation role, in particular for development-related disputes.
• KDP is helping to improve inter-group and state-society relations, making areas more immune to violent conflict.
• The survey results show perceived improvements in dispute handling, and the qualitative fieldwork links the program with normative changes: KDP (when it functions well) creates a positive precedent, stimulating demand for changes in local decision-making and conflict resolution.
• KDP’s impacts vary because political, cultural, institutional, and economic contexts vary.
• Development programs should prepare to handle the conflict that accompanies them.

The report recommends explicitly addressing the conflict inherent in development interventions, and taking potential conflicts into account in both planning and implementation. Projects should be based on a detailed knowledge of the contexts in which they will operate, so that they do not inadvertently lead to conflict. Socialization must be comprehensive and ongoing, monitoring must be tight, and complaints must be addressed. Both state and informal leaders need to be embedded in the process. In conflict situations, actors involved should be included in ways appropriate to local customs (insofar as that is possible).

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=970
http://bit.ly/1HnTBES
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

Anthony Torrens
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This independent study commissioned by the World Bank for KDP examines the economic impacts of 113 KDP rural infrastructure projects, focusing on roads, bridges, water supplies, and irrigation, the four types of infrastructure most commonly requested by KDP villages across Indonesia. The study finds that:

• Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of infrastructure across four provinces averaged 52.7 percent.
• KDP delivers projects at an average of 55.82 percent of the cost of government contracting.
• 106 out of 113 projects were ranked as technically “good” or “very good”.
• Operation and maintenance costs are routinely underestimated, and beyond the ability of villages to bear.
• Technical facilitators significantly improved the quality and accuracy of proposals, and overcame a wide variety of problems with earlier projects.

While the report cautions that some of the numbers appear very high, even the most conservative interpretations would allow that KDP is creating substantial returns on investment, at far lower costs than government contractors can provide.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Analisis Dampak Ekonomi Pasca-Konstruksi Program Prasarana Desa PPK: Laporan Akhir : Ringkasan Eksekutif Januari 2005


Project(s): KDP/World Bank
Study Location(s): East Java, East Nusa Tenggara, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi
Methodology: Quantitative
Language(s): English, Bahasa Indonesia
Keywords: Rural infrastructure, maintenance, technical facilitators
This study evaluates the quality of infrastructure in a sample of villages that had completed building the first year of KDP Phase II, covering technical quality and a range of other indicators, including project management, the role of the community, maintenance, and the opinions of the community about KDP. The report finds that:

- Women made up 11.99 percent of the KDP infrastructure workforce.
- Projects require an average of 3.75 months to complete.
- Project budgets and technical drawings were available in 84 percent of villages surveyed, but unavailable in 16 percent. Only a small number of these documents were stored in publicly accessible places.
- No KDP projects were found to seriously harm the environment. Most were neutral, 6 percent did light environmental damage, and nearly 10 percent were beneficial.
- In nearly 5 percent of cases land was improperly acquired, occasionally leading to serious conflict.
- Only 38 percent of villages had properly functioning maintenance groups.
- Officials and non-formal leaders significantly over-report the benefits and under-report the problems with KDP.
- Youths and housewives were less likely to work in KDP, to be satisfied with KDP wages, participate in planning, or know KDP budgets.

The report recommends that district facilitators receive mandatory in-service training, and train sub-district facilitators in turn. This training should cover program requirements for land and asset acquisition, change orders, the definitions of various terms such as "work force" and "person-days of labor," and the ability to record such data correctly. The National Management Consultants (NMC) should develop additional methods to increase the involvement of women and youth in the program.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=3104

Bahasa Indonesia version:

Laporan Akhir Evaluasi Kualitas Prasarana PPK Siklus IV

KDP2 MATCHING GRANT STUDY LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Paul Adams
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

The second phase of KDP (2003-06) included a Matching Grant scheme, designed to encourage district governments to supplement KDP with their own funds. Under the scheme districts that funded the inclusion of extra sub-districts in KDP would receive additional no-cost technical assistance in the form of training and facilitation through KDP project consultants. By 2003, 79 out of 190 districts participating in KDP had pledged to provide Matching Grants, extending KDP to an additional 150 sub-districts.

This study looks at the factors that moved district governments to join or stay out of the program, and at the issues—both with the project and with government—that made the Matching Grant scheme less effective than it might have been. Key findings include:

• Districts that participated were motivated by a recognition that community participation in development reduces costs, and by a desire to curry favor with the central government.
• Offers of no-cost technical assistance and facilitation did not lure in more districts.
• Ministries competing for a limited budget were unwilling to concede funds for matching grants.
• District contributions were generally small, on average 1.2 percent of the development budget.
• District governments are unwilling to concede roles or functions to consultants or higher levels.
• In districts without “champions” for the program, other interests (DPRD, line agencies) succeeded in paring back or eliminating matching grants.
• Bureaucratic confusion and inefficiency, and poor information-sharing between levels of government were significant obstacles.
• Officials follow regulations to the letter, even when they are clearly not in the best interests of the program.
• KDP was not aligned with the government disbursement schedule.

The report recommends taking steps to help second-tier officials and local line ministries “buy in” to KDP: targeted socialization, training, and clearly defined roles for everyone whose work touches on CDD. Information flows from “champions” to local government assemblies need to be improved, and could include regular bulletins and workshops. KDP should be aligned with the Government’s fiscal year.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=3108
Local governments in several parts of Indonesia have started KDP replication or “spin-off” projects funded through their own budgets. This study examines 10 such KDP replication schemes in greater depth, assessing their adoption of KDP principles and program features, and looking for insight into how KDP may be influencing local governance, community capacity building, and service delivery.

- Local-government spin-offs do not target the poor or women’s groups.
- Village contributions tend to be very high, from 10 percent to nearly 60 percent.
- Local-government spin-offs generally do not include inter-village competition.
- Financial management is poor and transparency low.
- Most spin-offs lack a formal complaints mechanism.
- None emphasize maintenance, long-term planning, or sustainability.
- None have anti-corruption strategies.

The study recommends studying these spin-offs further and ultimately engaging with them, mainly through training: facilitation techniques, bookkeeping, financial controls and accountability measures, reviewing good and bad practices, and promoting “horizontal learning.” KDP should help spin-offs to sync their cycles with grant allocations and local government fiscal years. And studies should compare local spin-offs with KDP, looking for innovations and efficiencies.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=2027
INDONESIA’S KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: A LARGE-SCALE USE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TO REDUCE POVERTY

Scott Guggenheim, Tatag Wiranto, Yogana Prasta, Susan Wong
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

Originally presented at “Scaling Up Poverty Reduction,” a conference held in Shanghai on May 25-27, 2004, this paper details the explosive growth of KDP, outlines the successes and challenges of the program, and offers lessons for large-scale CDD projects in other countries. Main points include:

• Scaling up KDP required overcoming constraints in World Bank and government procedures.
  o Devising a fiduciary system with adequate controls without adding extensive delays to the project.
  o KDP’s transfer system allows for very little discretion by government officials.
• Preliminary evidence suggests that KDP’s core design works well in conflict and transitional countries.
• KDP offers an efficient cost-effective way to provide large amounts of low-cost, low-tech village infrastructure, especially farm to market linkages over very large areas.
• Indonesia’s fiscal transfer system is often very slow, and as much as nine months of the fiscal year can be lost to delays. KDP’s disbursement system rarely takes as long as a month.
• Preliminary survey evidence suggests that villages that have gone through KDP show significantly higher levels of trust in government.
• KDP’s overall management costs run about 15 to 20 percent higher than standard World Bank supervision allocations, mostly attributable to KDP’s unusual size.
• Constantly changing rules and responsibilities mean that project rulebooks struggle to keep up.
• KPD is not useful for investments that involve recurrent costs, coordinating across investments, or technically difficult activities.

The report emphasizes that KDP does not substitute for a broad-based poverty reduction strategy. Generating local growth requires much more attention to the incentive environments that favor investment, employment, and local resource mobilization. KDP can contribute to a poverty strategy of this sort, but it does not replace the need for a more broad-based action program. Government ownership must be increased, but at the same time the community’s ability to make decisions and manage funds should not be lost in the rush for government ownership. While the first generation of KDP worked primarily to introduce mechanisms for community development planning and management, future generations can and must rebuild links to the more formal government planning structure.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=3115
MONITORING CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN INDONESIA (NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 11753)

Benjamin A. Olken
Published by: National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge

This paper uses a randomized field experiment to examine several approaches to reducing corruption. The author measures corruption in over 600 village road projects in Indonesia by having engineers independently estimate the prices and quantities of all inputs used in each road, and then comparing these estimates to villages' official expenditure reports. Key findings include:

- Announcing the increased likelihood of a government audit decreased theft of materials by 8 percent.
- Audits are cost effective, generating enough savings to cover the extra expense.
- Increasing community monitoring reduced wage theft, but those savings were offset by an increase in materials theft.
- Community monitoring may work only for private goods, not public goods.
- Submitting written comments may substitute for attendance at meetings.

While this paper used measurements of actual corruption, most researchers are forced to use data on people's perceptions of corruption rather than direct measures. Future work can compare perceptions with actual corruption, to explore the relationship between perceived corruption and reality.

http://www.nber.org/papers/w11753
INDONESIA KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: BUILDING A MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM FOR A LARGE-SCALE COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Susan Wong
Published by: EASES World Bank

This paper describes the monitoring and evaluation system developed for KDP. It includes a detailed description of its components, how they were constructed and operationalized, and the challenges encountered while incorporating these multi-faceted activities into a large CDD program.

Key components:
• Field monitoring and reporting by government officials and consultants.
• Community participatory monitoring, by BPD, CSOs, and community groups.
• Case studies.
• Documentation of lessons learned.
• NMC financial supervision and training unit.
• Procedures for handling complaints and grievances.
• NGO province-level monitoring.
• Independent monitoring by journalists.
• Impact evaluation studies.
• Loan evaluations.
• Audits and financial reviews.


http://bit.ly/1zCg9et
ENHANCING WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION:
LEARNING FROM FIELD EXPERIENCE

KDP
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This book was developed as a practical resource for KDP facilitators, following a three-day workshop held in Bogor on March 21-23, 2002. It includes lessons learned from field experience, and a section on monitoring and evaluation. Key points include:

- Invitations must explicitly include wives as well as husbands.
- Setting targets helps raise attendance.
- Scheduling, location, length, and regularity of meetings all impact women’s attendance.
- Female facilitators require extra training and support.
- Women need help in defending their proposals in the open process.
- Data on key participation indicators should be collected in meetings, by looking at proposals, and by monitoring of the planning and execution of KDP projects.

The book closes with a list of “experts’ questions,” derived from experiences bringing women into CDD in other countries.


Bahasa Indonesia version:

Meningkatkan Partisipasi Aktif Perempuan: Belajar dari Pengalaman

DO WOMEN MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE? KDP1 GENDER DATA ANALYSIS: INTERIM REPORT

Susan Wong
Published by: World Bank

This paper looks at the impact of gender on KDP Years 1, 2 and 3 (1998 to 2001), including the types of activities requested by women’s groups, and whether proposals from women’s groups do better or worse than those from other beneficiary groups. The paper also explores the effects of KDP’s affirmative action initiatives to improve women’s representation. Has representation led to greater empowerment and in turn greater benefits for women? What influence, if any, have women’s groups and female facilitators had on the program?

• Women’s groups overwhelmingly propose economic activities (74 percent) over infrastructure (26 percent). But economic programs, which have smaller budgets and impacts than big-ticket items, get trimmed off as villages hone their proposals.
• Having female facilitators did not make much difference in the number, type, or total proportion of women’s proposals.
• There was no major difference in selection rates between proposals submitted by men or women.
• The gender of the facilitator had no impact on the likelihood of women’s proposals being selected.
• KDP recruiters claim there are several reasons why they have difficulties in finding women to be sub-district facilitators (facilitator kecamatan, or FK):
  o women are reluctant to travel to villages or isolated areas alone;
  o women lack confidence and are less likely to apply for jobs; and
  o women have more responsibilities at home that prevent them from traveling.
• KDP recruiters often assume that these issues make women “less reliable” facilitators than men. In practice, however, turnover rates were higher for men than women, and there was no evidence that women are “less reliable” than men.
• Female facilitators did not necessarily advocate more strongly for women’s rights than their male counterparts.

KDP1 demonstrates that even bold affirmative action does not easily or rapidly empower women. While this cannot be seen in the data, women consistently report feeling more comfortable expressing themselves in front of a female facilitator. As such, the importance of female leaders and role models should not be underestimated.

http://psflibrary.org/collection/detail.php?id=3110
This paper argues that KDP is a large-scale tool allowing the Government to work effectively in parts of the country racked by social conflict, such as Aceh, Papua, Central Kalimantan, Poso in Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, and Maluku. Some key points include:

- KDP provides a useful framework for negotiations and consensus building.
- KDP delivers much-needed technical and financial assistance to meet community needs.
- Once disputes do arise, KDP has found that involving villagers and communities at the outset is the best way to resolve issues.

The report recommends guaranteeing the security and safety of communities and KDP consultants, emphasizing the fundamental principles of community participation and transparency, and maintaining a scrupulously apolitical stance. Mechanisms for open discussion and consensus-building must be reinforced so that grievances can be discussed and resolved before they erupt into violence. Finally, site visits by ministers and other government officials help to demonstrate the Government’s support and commitment to development and poverty alleviation in those areas.

VILLAGE CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA: FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN THE WORLD BANK’S KECAMATAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Andrea Woodhouse
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This paper examines where, why, and how corruption occurs in KDP: how the actors perceive their interests, what motivates them, what kinds of constraints they face, and what kinds of steps they take to resolve their problems. The paper argues that corruption is primarily a problem of incentives, and can be fought effectively only by changing the costs and benefits attached to corrupt behavior. It also claims that the local context and social norms are key to understanding how these incentives can be changed in order to reduce corruption. Key findings include:

• Corruption in Indonesian villages is encouraged by:
  o Bureaucracy and red tape, which create opportunities for rent-seeking.
  o A history of impunity for corruptors and oppression of whistleblowers.
  o The power of village elites, combined with a weak and corrupt judicial system, impeding poor people’s access to justice and control over decision-making.
  o The New Order government’s conscious strategy of depoliticizing villages.
  o The use of development funds for patronage and control.
• Complexity: all parties may have dirty hands, including those that are relatively powerless.
• KDP’s anti-corruption strategy begins by putting information in the hands of participants.
• Transparency, community participation, and the provision of independent channels for resolving complaints help curtail corruption in KDP.
• Facilitators provide information independent of local governments, and have more protection from threats and intimidation than ordinary villagers.
• It is important to identify clean leaders and to try to involve them in the anti-corruption cause.

The paper recommends changing the underlying system of incentives for KDP actors, including lowering the potential costs of whistle-blowing. Monopolies should be limited, the discretion of various actors should be clarified, and accountability ramped up for the project as a whole. KDP staff should receive better training, especially in information-sharing and transparency. Future strategies should take into account the local contexts.

REVIEW OF THE KDP MICROCREDIT APPROACH

Detlev Holloh
Published by: World Bank Group, Washington DC

This report reviewed KDP’s microcredit system to provide recommendations for the KDP 2, which ran between January 2002 and June 2006. The review focuses on the supply side of KDP’s microcredit system, supposing that if credit management and services are adequate then loans will be unlikely to achieve their expected impact. The report finds that:

• Participatory planning is incompatible with credit and revolving loan fund management.
• Revolving loan funds at the village level are probably not viable: “the village is not the place of social integration and control.”
• Village competition and the involvement of council and forums have not improved performance or outreach.
• Systemic reasons for poor performance:
  o Poor financial management
  o Perception of credit as grants
  o Corruption
  o Lack of expertise at all levels.
• A few Unit Pengelola Kegiatan (UPK) perform well, some have potential but need help, most seem not to be viable—but KDP does not have the data to say which are which.
• Promoting linkages to Badan Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) is unrealistic outside Java, where rural BPRs are scarce. Even in Bali and Java, where BPRs are more common, they do not have village outreach.

The report concludes that KDP should change its approach or stop providing microcredit. If the program does continue, it needs a planning approach oriented to objectives and outputs. For microcredit to be viable, lending must be linked to savings, which the current program does not provide. Credit must be managed by well-trained staff following established principles, and kept fully separate from KDP’s grant-making activities.

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<td>DPRD</td>
<td><em>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</em> or District Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusun</td>
<td>Hamlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIRR</td>
<td>Economic Internal Rate of Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FK</td>
<td><em>Fasilitator Kabupaten/Kecamatan/Kelurahan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFLS</td>
<td>Indonesian Family Life Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamkesmas</td>
<td><em>Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat</em> or community health insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td><em>Kecamatan</em> Development Program or <em>Program Pengembangan Kecamatan</em> (PPK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelurahan</td>
<td>Urban district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepala desa</td>
<td>Head of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKM</td>
<td><em>Lembaga Keswadayaan Masyarakat</em> or Community Self-Help Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLI 1/2/3</td>
<td>Local Level Institution 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td><em>Musyawarah Antar Desa</em> or Intervillage Discussion Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-CRIL</td>
<td>Micro-Credit Ratings International Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFI</td>
<td>Microfinance institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP – ROI</td>
<td>Micro-Hydropower – Return on Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHA</td>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musrenbangdes</td>
<td><em>Musyawarah perencanaan pembangunan desa</em> or village planning meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Neighborhood Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>National Management Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2SPP/PNPM Integrasi</td>
<td><em>Program Pembangunan Sistem Perencanaan Partisipatif</em> or the Participatory System Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3BM</td>
<td>Pro-Poor Planning, Budgeting and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Portfolio at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAUD</td>
<td>Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini or early years education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEKKA</td>
<td>Pemberdayaan Perempuan Kepala Keluarga or Women Headed Household Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM Mandiri</td>
<td>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri or National Community Empowerment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM-Generasi</td>
<td>PNPM Mandiri Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM-RESPEK</td>
<td>PNPM Mandiri Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM-Rural</td>
<td>PNPM Mandiri Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM-Urban</td>
<td>PNPM Mandiri Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PODES</td>
<td>Potensi Desa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posyandu</td>
<td>Pos Pelayanan Terpadu or village health post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Peraturan Pemerintah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPK</td>
<td>Program Pengembangan Kecamatan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>PNPM Support Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puskesmas</td>
<td>Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat or community health center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raskin</td>
<td>Beras Miskin or Rice for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RKP</td>
<td>Rencana Kerja Pemerintah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLF</td>
<td>Revolving Loan Funds or pinjaman dana bergulir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Rukun Warga or neighbourhood leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setrawan</td>
<td>Public servants charged with promoting community empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKPD</td>
<td>Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah or local government technical agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Pertama or junior high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPADA</td>
<td>Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project or PNPM Mandiri Daerah Tertinggal dan Khusus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Social Safety Net or Jaringan Pengamanan Sosial (JPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSENAS</td>
<td>Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional or National Socio-economic Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Taman Kanak-kanak or kindergarten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPK</td>
<td>Tim Pengelola Kegiatan or Project Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNP2K</td>
<td>Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPK</td>
<td>Unit Pelaksana Kegiatan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPK</td>
<td>Unit Pengelolaan Keuangan or Financial Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Urban Poverty Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU Desa</td>
<td>Undang-Undang tentang Desa or Village Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSLIC-2</td>
<td>Water Supply &amp; Sanitation for Low Income Communities Phase 2 atau Program Air Bersih dan Sanitasi untuk Masyarakat Miskin Fase 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15 years of Indonesia's National Community-Driven Development Programs

The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP)
The National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM)